One-time memories (OTM's) are simple tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement onetime programs, a very general form of software protection and program obfuscation. Here we investigate the possibility of building OTM's using quantum mechanical devices. It is known that OTM's cannot exist in a fully-quantum world or in a fully-classical world. Instead, we propose a new model based on isolated qubits -qubits that can only be accessed using local operations and classical communication (LOCC). This model combines a quantum resource (single-qubit measurements) with a classical restriction (on communication between qubits), and can be implemented using current technologies, such as nitrogen vacancy centers in diamond. In this model, we construct OTM's that are information-theoretically secure against one-pass LOCC adversaries that use 2-outcome measurements.
INTRODUCTION
One-time memories (OTM's) are a simple type of tamperresistant cryptographic hardware [1] . An OTM device behaves as follows: one party (Alice) can write two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1} k into the device, and then give the device to another party (Bob); after receiving the device, Bob can then choose to read either s or t, but not both. An OTM is far simpler than a general-purpose processor, but it can be used to implement sophisticated forms of secure computation, such as one-time programs 1 [1, 2, 3] (and, more recently, quantum one-time programs [4] ). The remarkable fact about these constructions is that the OTM is the only piece of hardware that has to be tamper-resistant; everything else consists of cryptographic software running on untrusted general-purpose processors.
Intuitively, it seems much easier to build an OTM, rather than a general-purpose tamper-proof processor. Indeed, there are many practical approaches to building such devices. However, from a theoretical perspective, it would be nice if one could build provably-secure OTM's based on some clear physical principle, in the same way that one can build provablysecure encryption and signature schemes based on assumptions that certain problems are computationally intractable. But this line of investigation runs into a number of obstacles. OTM's cannot exist in a fully classical world, because information can always be copied without destroying it. One might hope to build OTM's in a quantum world, where the no-cloning principle limits an adversary's ability to copy an unknown quantum state. However, this is also impossible, because an OTM can be used to perform oblivious transfer with information-theoretic security, and there are strong no-go theorems for quantum oblivious transfer, quantum bit commitment, and many other kinds of two-party secure computation in a quantum world [5, 6, 7, 8] .
1 A one-time program is a package of hardware and software that is prepared by Alice and given to Bob. It can compute a function f (chosen by Alice when she prepares the package) on a single input x provided by Bob (when he runs the package). During its execution, the one-time program behaves like a black box, i.e., Bob learns nothing about its internal functioning. After running once, the one-time program "self-destructs," i.e., it stops functioning, and no more information can be extracted from it.
One way around these no-go theorems is to try to construct protocols that are secure against a restricted class of quantum adversaries. The adversaries in the no-go theorems (that break quantum bit commitment, oblivious transfer, etc.) seem to require the full power of a quantum computer, i.e., the ability to perform arbitrary quantum circuits with entangling gates. However, a number of authors have shown protocols for bit commitment and other functionalities that are secure against adversaries who can only perform k-local measurements [9] , or adversaries who only have bounded or noisy quantum storage [10, 11, 12, 13] .
In this paper, we propose a new model of this type, called the isolated qubits model. This model allows the adversary to perform local operations and classical communication (LOCC); intuitively, this is the class of operations that can generate classical correlations between the qubits, but not entanglement. We then aim to construct OTM's that are secure in this model.
The main challenge in this paper arises from the fact that OTM's are non-interactive: after Alice gives the OTM to Bob, there is no further communication between them. Thus, they cannot use standard cryptographic tools, such as privacy amplification, to give Bob an advantage over the adversary. This makes OTM's very different from most other protocols for bit-commitment and oblivious transfer.
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For our OTM's, we instead use an old idea called conjugate coding, which is due to Wiesner [16] , and which works in this non-interactive setting. Conjugate coding uses quantum states that are not entangled, hence they can be prepared by honest parties in our model. Wiesner argued that conjugate coding is secure against non-adaptive adversaries who can only perform single-qubit destructive measurements, but that it is not secure against adversaries who can perform many-qubit entangled measurements. However, apart from those two extreme cases, little seems to be known about the security of conjugate coding. It is a natural question, then, whether conjugate coding is secure against the more general class of LOCC adversaries (which may be adaptive, and may perform repeated weak measurements on the same qubit). If the answer turned out to be yes, this would be a fairly realistic scenario in which conjugate coding provides useful security.
Unfortunately, proving good upper bounds on the power of LOCC adversaries is a long-standing open problem. Previous results in this area include demonstrations of "nonlocality without entanglement" (NLWE) [17] (see [18] for a recent survey), and constructions of data-hiding states [19, 20, 21, 22] . However, these results do not seem to apply to our OTM's. We are only able to prove partial results on the security of our OTM's, but given that strong bounds of this type are quite rare, we believe this is significant progress.
On a conceptual level, we show that information can be hidden from an LOCC adversary in a stronger and more so-phisticated way, such that the adversary can retrieve one of the messages contained in the OTM, but not both. This contrasts with previous work on NLWE and data-hiding states. On a technical level, we prove security of our OTM's against "1-pass" LOCC adversaries (which may be adaptive, but are still restricted to destructive single-qubit measurements). This extends Wiesner's original claim, though not all the way to general LOCC adversaries. The techniques used to prove this result are quite nontrivial: we construct our OTM's using random codes, and we prove security using entropy chaining (also called Dudley's inequality for suprema of empirical processes [23] , or "using correlations to beat the union bound").
Isolated qubits
In this paper we consider a model with isolated qubits, where all parties are only allowed to perform local quantum operations (on each qubit) and classical communication (between qubits). This class of operations is known as n-partite LOCC, where n is the number of qubits. (See Section 2 for details.) We will construct an OTM that consists of n isolated qubits. When Alice prepares the device, she can perform n-partite LOCC operations on the qubits, and likewise, when Bob reads the device, he can perform n-partite LOCC operations on the qubits. However, there is no communication or interaction between Alice and Bob, apart from the step where Alice gives the device (containing the n qubits) to Bob.
Note that this is a different scenario from most previous work on the power of LOCC operations [17, 19] , where Alice and Bob share some bipartite quantum system, and a "local operation" refers to an arbitrary operation on either Alice's subsystem or Bob's subsystem, and "classical communication" refers to communication between Alice and Bob.
Our model of isolated qubits is motivated by recent experimental work on nitrogen vacancy centers in diamond [24] . Nitrogen vacancy (NV) centers can be used to implement single qubits that have relatively long coherence times (on the order of seconds or minutes), at room temperature in a solid-state material. Individual NV centers can be read out and manipulated optically, but it is difficult to perform entangling operations on pairs of NV centers, due to variations in their emission spectra. (Recent experiments have demonstrated entanglement between distant NV centers [25] , but for our purposes there are natural ways of designing a device to prevent such entangling operations.) NV centers have been studied in connection with quantum money [26] , and they are a plausible candidate to implement our model of isolated qubits.
Isolated qubits are similar (but not directly comparable) to Salvail's k-local measurement model [9] . In Salvail's model, the adversary can perform entangled measurements on up to k qubits, where k is proportional to n; however, the adversary is only allowed to perform projective measurements, not repeated weak measurements (which are allowed in LOCC).
We also argue that isolated qubits can exist in a world with quantum computers. Isolated qubits are simply designed to satisfy different requirements than the qubits in a quantum computer. More specifically, recall that in any quantum device, there is a tradeoff between two conflicting requirements: first, protecting the device from unwanted interactions with the environment, such as noise and decoherence; and second, providing strong coherent interactions between the device and an external probe, in order to perform some useful task. Isolated qubits represent one possible compromise between these requirements, namely strong protection from noise and decoherence, and only classical (not entangling) gates and measurements. (Note that one cannot teleport information to or from an isolated qubit.) In contrast, quantum computers and quantum memories must satisfy both of the above requirements, which is a different, possibly more difficult task. (Indeed, the bounded / noisy storage model [10, 13] assumes that it is hard to build large, high-fidelity quantum memories.)
In some sense, our isolated qubits model is complementary to the bounded / noisy storage model. In the bounded / noisy storage model, the honest parties Alice and Bob use qubits that may allow entangled measurements, but cannot be stored for a long time. In our model, Alice and Bob use qubits that can be stored for a long time, but do not allow entangled measurements.
Data-hiding states
Our first main result is a construction for data hiding states (see Section 3). These states are simpler to analyze than our one-time memories, and they demonstrate the basic point that a sender can use LOCC operations to "hide" information from a LOCC receiver. We consider a system of n isolated qubits, and we construct a set of 2ñ states, wherẽ n := n − Θ(1), by sampling independently at random from the set {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− } ⊗n . (Here, |+ := (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2 and |− := (|0 − |1 )/ √ 2 are the Hadamard basis states.) These states are all tensor products of single-qubit pure states, hence they can be prepared using only LOCC operations.
First, we show that these states can be distinguished almost perfectly using an entangled quantum measurement (the "pretty good measurement," see Section 3.1). Then we consider "one-pass" LOCC measurement strategies, i.e., measurement strategies that measure each qubit at most once. (For comparison, a general LOCC measurement strategy may perform many weak measurements on the same qubit. Note that bounding the power of general LOCC measurement strategies is a difficult open problem.) We show that a one-pass LOCC measurement strategy using 2-outcome measurements can extract at most ≈ n/2 bits of information about which state was prepared 3 (see Section 3.2). Note that there exists a trivial LOCC measurement strategy that can extract n/2 bits of information, by measuring each qubit in the {|0 , |1 } basis, for instance; hence the above bound is tight. In addition, we show that a one-pass LOCC measurement strategy using q-outcome measurements (for any constant q) can extract at most ≈ (0.7067)n bits of information (see Section 3.3).
The main point of this data-hiding result is to develop the proof techniques for our one-time memories, which will use a similar idea of sampling random states from the set {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− } ⊗n , but will restrict access to the data in a more subtle way. We use two proof techniques: entropy chaining, and a bound on the collision entropy. We will describe these techniques below.
In addition, our data-hiding states may also be of independent interest, as they differ from previous work in some significant ways. On one hand, most previous construc-tions of data-hiding states [19, 20, 21, 22] are secure against a much stronger class of LOCC adversaries (with infinite LOCC rather than one-pass LOCC). On the other hand, almost all of those constructions use entangled states, which cannot be realized in our isolated qubits model. (An exception is [20] , which uses separable Werner states. This approach too is quite different from ours.)
We remark that another line of work has focused on "nonlocality without entanglement" [17] , where one considers a bipartite system, and one constructs sets of separable states that are orthogonal but cannot be perfectly distinguished using LOCC; see [18] for a recent survey. Finally, there are a number of elegant results about unambiguous state discrimination using multipartite LOCC, which are applicable when the number of states to be distinguished is relatively small [27, 28, 29] .
Entropy chaining
One of our proof techniques is "entropy chaining," aka Dudley's inequality for empirical processes [23] . This is similar to a union bound over the set of all one-pass adaptive LOCC measurement strategies, but it takes advantage of the positive correlations between the performance of strategies that are similar. This approach gives a tight bound for adversaries that use 2-outcome measurements, but it performs poorly when applied to adversaries that use q-outcome measurements for large q (see Section 3.2).
The basic idea is as follows. Let E denote the random choices made in the construction of our data-hiding states. Let the resulting collection of data-hiding states be denoted by |E(u) (for all u ∈ {0, 1}ñ); note that the description of these states is public information. We imagine a game, where first an adversary chooses some measurement strategy M ; then a referee chooses u ∈ {0, 1}ñ uniformly at random, and prepares the state |E(u) ; and finally the adversary performs the measurement strategy M on |E(u) , and outputs a string of measurement outcomes z. The adversary's goal is to maximize the mutual information I(Z; U ) (where Z and U are random variables containing the strings z and u). Note that I(Z; U ) is computed by averaging over the referee's choice of u and the adversary's measurement outcomes z; however, we do not average over the random choices E used to construct the data-hiding states, or the adversary's measurement strategy M . Thus I(Z; U ) is a random variable that depends on both E and M .
As a first step, note that if we fix a particular adversary strategy, then with high probability over E, I(Z; U ) ≈ n/2. To see this, write I(Z; U ) = H(Z) − H(Z|U ); note that for 1-pass LOCC strategies using 2-outcome measurements, H(Z) ≤ n; and note that H(Z|U ) = 2
is a sum of independent random variables with respect to E; hence by Hoeffding's inequality, with high probability over E, H(Z|U ) will be close to its expected value, which is roughly n/2.
We want to prove a much stronger statement, however. We want to estimate the probability (over the random choice of E) that the best LOCC strategy (chosen with knowledge of the states |E(u) ) can extract more than n/2 bits of information about U . To achieve this, we can try to use the union bound over all possible LOCC strategies. However, note that adaptive LOCC strategies can be described by decision trees, and in the case of 1-pass LOCC strategies using 2-outcome measurements, there are 2 Θ(2 n ) such decision trees. Meanwhile, the quantity H(Z|U ) is a sum of only 2ñ independent random variables, so the failure probability in Hoeffding's inequality is only exponentially small in n, not doubly-exponentially small in n. Thus the union bound fails to give a useful result.
Entropy chaining fixes this problem by exploiting correlations among the different strategies -the fact that two strategies that make similar measurements will produce similar results, and hence their failure probabilities do not add up in the worst-case fashion described by the union bound. The term "entropy chaining" refers to the fact that one must use a sequence of these arguments, to capture both strong correlations between very similar strategies and weak correlations between less-similar strategies. Each such argument involves covering the set of strategies with an ε-net at a different resolution, which can be interpreted as bounding the entropy of the set.
Bounding the collision entropy
Our second proof technique involves calculating the collision entropy of the unknown message U , conditioned on every possible sequence of measurement outcomes. This approach does not give a tight bound, but it works fairly well for all values of q (see Section 3.3).
Here we take a different perspective: instead of considering LOCC measurement strategies (which correspond to decision trees), we consider measurement outcomes (which correspond to tensor products of single-qubit POVM elements). That is, a measurement outcome is described by a POVM element of the form MA = i∈A Mi, where A ⊂ [n] is the set of qubits that were measured, and Mi is a POVM element acting on qubit i. (Measurement outcomes have this form when the adversary performs separable measurements, which include LOCC measurements as a special case; but this does not hold when the adversary performs entangled measurements.)
The basic idea is to fix some measurement outcome MA, then lower-bound the collision entropy H2(U |MA) (with high probability over E), and then use the union bound over all measurement outcomes MA. To lower-bound H2(U |MA), we proceed as follows. Essentially we want to upper-bound the collision probability
To do this, we note that both Pr
2 are sums of independent random variables (with respect to E), and we use large deviation bounds. Finally, to take the union bound over all MA, we note that we only have to include those MA that are of tensor product form, hence the number of MA is exponential in |A|, rather than doubly exponential in |A|.
One-time memories
We now describe our construction for one-time memories (see Section 4.2). We consider a system of n isolated qubits, and we pick two random error-correcting codes, C :
(That is, each codeword is chosen independently and uniformly at random in {0, 1} n .) Given two messages s and t in {0, 1} k , we prepare each qubit i (for i = 1, 2, . . . , n) as follows. Let C(s)i and D(t)i denote the i'th bit in the strings C(s) and D(t), respectively. We prepare the i'th qubit in a pure state that has the following properties: first, if the qubit is measured in the {|0 , |1 } basis, the outcome is more likely to be |0 if C(s)i = 0, and |1 if C(s)i = 1; and second, if the qubit is measured in the {|+ , |− } basis, the outcome is more likely to be |+ if D(t)i = 0, and |− if D(t)i = 1. This is similar to Wiesner's idea of quantum conjugate coding [16] . We refer to these states as one-time memory (OTM) states.
It is straightforward to check that these OTM states can be prepared using only LOCC operations, and that an honest party can recover either s or t using only LOCC operations (see Section 4.3).
However, the security of these OTM states is somewhat problematic. For instance, an LOCC adversary can always obtain partial information about both s and t, by measuring some of the qubits in the {|0 , |1 } basis and some of the qubits in the {|+ , |− } basis. Also, these OTM states can "leak" extra information: there is a one-pass LOCC strategy that can extract n/2 ≈ (1.2528)k bits of information about s and t. 4 To address this issue, we define a notion of a "leaky OTM," which we believe is a useful first step towards constructing one-time programs from realistic physical devices (see Section 4.1).
We then present some evidence that our OTM states satisfy this notion of "leaky security". Essentially, we prove that our OTM states satisfy a weaker notion of security, in which the smoothed min-entropy H ε ∞ is replaced by the Shannon entropy H (see Section 4.2). We believe it should be possible to strengthen this result to show "leaky security." In particular, we note that certain parts of the proof already use the collision entropy H2, which is stronger than H, and implies bounds on H ε ∞ . Our technical result is that no 1-pass LOCC adversary using 2-outcome measurements can extract more than ≈ (1.9189)k < 2k bits of information about (s, t) (see Section 4.4). (We believe that this constant factor can be improved.) The proof uses a two-stage argument that applies both the collision entropy bound and entropy chaining; we will describe this below.
We remark that there is a subtle point involving the difference between 1-pass LOCC measurements and general LOCC measurements, when applied to our OTM's based on conjugate coding. For our OTM's, there is a 1-pass LOCC measurement that can reconstruct s (and there is a similar measurement for t). Also, Winter's "gentle measurement lemma" [39] implies that, if there is a nondestructive measurement that reconstructs s, and there is a similar measurement for t, then there is a measurement that reconstructs both s and t simultaneously. However, this does not imply the existence of a 2-pass LOCC measurement that can reconstruct both s and t simultaneously.
The reason is that, in order to reconstruct s (or t) using 1-pass LOCC operations, the measurement must be destructive (i.e., one must perform a projective measurement on each qubit, obtain a string of classical measurement outcomes, and then run the classical decoding algorithm). If one wants to reconstruct s (or t) using a nondestructive measurement, one must use entangling operations (i.e., one must run the classical decoding algorithm on a superposition of many different inputs). Thus the gentle measurement lemma cannot be applied to these particular 1-pass LOCC measurements, and it does not rule out the possibility that our OTM's are secure against 2-pass or general LOCC adversaries.
Two-stage argument
Let us denote our OTM states by |E(s, t) (for s, t ∈ {0, 1} k ). These states resemble the data-hiding states studied previously, but there are some important differences. First, there are fewer OTM states (there are 4 k states in dimension 2 n , where k ≈ (0.3991)n), hence the states are easier to distinguish. Also, the OTM states are not constructed independently at random: there are 4 k states |E(s, t) , but only 2 · 2 k independent random variables (consisting of the codewords C(s) and D(t)). As a result, there are positive correlations between states |E(s, t) that have the same s but different t.
To deal with the correlations among the states |E(s, t) , we use large-deviation bounds for sums of locally dependent random variables [41, 38] . However, these large-deviation bounds are not as strong as the ones we had for data-hiding states, and so neither of our proof techniques (i.e., entropy chaining and collision entropy) gives a useful result by itself.
To get around this difficulty, we combine the two techniques in sequence. Let S and T be random variables containing the messages s and t. We use the collision entropy technique to analyze the first few steps taken by the adversary; this yields a lower-bound on H2(S, T |MA), for any measurement outcome MA observed by the adversary thus far. Then we use entropy chaining to prove bounds on the adversary's subsequent steps; this yields an upper-bound on I(Z; S, T |MA), whereZ is the adversary's output from subsequent measurements. It is necessary to apply the two techniques in this order, because the collision entropy technique yields an upper-bound on st Pr[S = s, T = t|MA] 2 ; this helps us to get stronger large-deviation bounds for the quantity
which is crucial for entropy chaining.
Outlook
We think it is an interesting challenge to develop our OTM construction into a useful primitive for secure computation. In this paper we have taken a first step, by constructing OTM's based on isolated qubits, and analyzing their security in a simple information-theoretic framework (e.g., using random codes in the OTM's, and describing the adversary's knowledge in terms of mutual information). The next step is to make our OTM's efficient, and prove a stronger security guarantee that allows composition of OTM's to implement one-time programs.
First, we conjecture that the random codes C and D can be replaced by some class of efficiently-decodable codes, to construct computationally-efficient one-time memories that are secure against computationally-bounded LOCC adversaries. For comparison, note that the present construction, while not computationally efficient, also makes no assumptions about the adversary's computational power, i.e., it is secure against one-pass LOCC adversaries that have unbounded computational power.
Second, we conjecture that our OTM's satisfy a particular notion of "leaky security," which we believe will be useful for constructing one-time programs. This notion of "leaky security" uses the smoothed min-entropy to quantify the adversary's uncertainty about the messages s and t. Here we presented bounds that support this conjecture, using the Shannon entropy and the collision entropy.
Finally, it is an open problem to better understand the security of Wiesner's conjugate coding technique against general LOCC strategies (rather than the one-pass LOCC strategies considered here).
Notation
For any integer n ≥ 1, we define the set [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any vector v ∈ C n , we define the 2 norm v 2 =
An ε-net E (for a set S, with respect to some metric d) is a subset E ⊆ S such that, for all x ∈ S, there exists some x ∈ E, such that d(x, x ) ≤ ε. The covering number N (S, d, ε) is the minimum cardinality of any such ε-net E.
Logarithms are denoted as follows: ln(·) is the natural logarithm, lg(·) is the base-2 logarithm, and log(·) is the logarithm when the base does not matter (because the log appears inside a big-O expression).
The Hamming distance between two binary strings s, t ∈ {0, 1} n is denoted dH (s, t). The L1 or total variation distance between two random variables X and X is denoted by ∆(X,
The Shannon entropy of a random variable X is denoted by H(X) = − x Pr[X = x] lg Pr[X = x], and the mutual information between random variables X and Y is denoted by I(X; Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ). (Note that I without parentheses denotes the identity operator. It will be clear from the context which one is meant.)
The Renyi collision entropy of X is denoted H2(
The min-entropy of X is given by
, and the smoothed minentropy of X is given by H ε ∞ (X) = max X : ∆(X,X )≤ε H∞(X ).
ISOLATED QUBITS, AND LOCC MEA-SUREMENT STRATEGIES
In this section we introduce the model of isolated qubits, and the class of LOCC measurement strategies. Essentially, in a system of n isolated qubits, the allowed operations are local (single-qubit) quantum operations, and classical communication between qubits. These are n-party LOCC operations, where each party holds a single qubit.
Any n-party LOCC measurement strategy can be described as a sequence of steps, which outputs a sequence of measurement outcomes, as follows:
Begin at step 1.
At step a, conditioned on the output of the previous steps 1, 2, . . . , a − 1: Choose one of the parties, specified by i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Choose some measurement M .
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Perform the measurement M on the i'th party's qubits; this yields some outcome j.
Output j, and proceed to step a + 1.
LOCC measurement strategies can use an unbounded number of steps, and can measure each qubit many times, for instance by using a sequence of weak measurements (which may be chosen adaptively). Strategies using unbounded LOCC are difficult to analyze; in particular, it is a longstanding open problem to prove strong quantitative bounds on the amount of information returned by strategies using unbounded LOCC.
Here we consider a restricted class of LOCC strategies: those that measure each qubit at most once. We will refer to these as 1-pass LOCC strategies.
Let us introduce some notation. A 1-pass LOCC strategy consists of n steps, labeled by a ∈ [n] (where we define [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}). Suppose the strategy uses single-qubit measurements that have at most q outcomes. At step a, let z<a := (z1, z2, . . . , za−1) ∈ [q] a−1 be the output of the previous steps; let Qa(z<a) ∈ [n] be the choice of which qubit to measure next; let Ma(z<a, ζ) ∈ C 2×2 (for all ζ ∈ [q]) be the POVM elements corresponding to the choice of measurement in this step; and let za be the actual measurement outcome that is obtained, so that Ma(z ≤a ) is the corresponding POVM element. We can write the complete strategy as a POVM measurement on n qubits, whose elements are given by
where Ma(z ≤a ) acts on the qubit indicated by Qa(z<a).
A state discrimination game
Consider a collection of n-qubit quantum states |E(u) , indexed by u ∈ U. How well can an LOCC adversary distinguish among these states? To make this question precise, one can define the following state discrimination game: first the referee chooses u ∈ U uniformly at random, then prepares the corresponding state |E(u) , and gives it to the adversary; then the adversary carries out some LOCC measurement strategy, and outputs some string z ∈ [q] n . We can measure the adversary's success in terms of the mutual information I(Z; U ), where U and Z are the random variables describing the referee's choice and the adversary's output.
Note that, in the isolated qubits model, each party holds a single qubit (rather than a higher-dimensional quantum system). We can make use of this fact, to further simplify the set of possible LOCC strategies.
5 Any measurement can be described by a set of measurement operators K1, K2, . . . which satisfy j K † j Kj = I. For a given state ρ, the measurement returns outcome j with probability tr(KjρK † j ), and the post-measurement state (conditioned on observing j) is KjρK † j / tr(KjρK † j ). Note that the measurement can also be described by a set of POVM elements Mj = K † j Kj; the probability of observing outcome j can then be written as tr(Mjρ).
Lemma 2.1. Let M be any 1-pass LOCC strategy in the isolated qubits model, which uses q-outcome measurements and returns output Z. Then there exists M , a 1-pass LOCC strategy in the isolated qubits model, which uses q-outcome measurements and returns output Z , and has the following additional properties:
1. I(Z ; U ) ≥ I(Z; U ) (when playing the state discrimination game shown above).
2. In every measurement performed by M , the POVM elements all have rank 1.
Proof: See Appendix A in the full version of this paper [42] .
Discretization of LOCC strategies
Let S be the set of all single-qubit measurements with q outcomes, where every POVM element has rank 1:
This is a continuous set. In our proofs, we would like to approximate it by a finite ε-net L, with respect to some appropriate metric t. It will be convenient to define t as follows:
(Here · denotes the operator norm.) The following two lemmas bound the size of the ε-net L, first in the special case where q = 2 (for which we have a better bound), and then in the general case where q ≥ 2.
Lemma 2.2. Let q = 2. For any 0 < ε ≤ 1, there exists an ε-net L for S, with respect to the metric t, that has cardinality |L| ≤ C/ε 2 (where C is some numerical constant). Equivalently, we have N (S, t, ε) ≤ C/ε 2 .
Lemma 2.3. Let q ≥ 2. For any 0 < ε ≤ 1, there exists an ε-net L for S, with respect to the metric t, that has cardinality |L| ≤ (C/ε) 3q (where C is some numerical constant). Equivalently, we have N (S, t, ε) ≤ (C/ε) 3q .
We now bound the effect of this discretization when applied to a complete LOCC strategy. Essentially, if we choose ε ≤ O(1/qn), then the discretization has a negligible effect on the amount of information returned by the strategy.
Lemma 2.4. Let M be any 1-pass LOCC strategy in the isolated qubits model, which uses q-outcome measurements, where all POVM elements have rank 1, and which has output Z. Fix some 0 < ε ≤ 1/(qne), and let L be the ε-net for S defined above. Let M be the strategy that is obtained by duplicating the strategy M, and replacing each measurement M ∈ S with the best approximating measurementM ∈ L. Let Z be the output of the strategy M . Then
where η(x) := −x lg x.
DATA-HIDING STATES
Consider a system of n qubits. We will construct a set B of 2ñ quantum states, withñ ≥ n − O (1) , that has the following properties:
1. The states are pure and unentangled (i.e., they are tensor products of pure single-qubit states).
2. There exists an entangled quantum measurement that distinguishes these states almost perfectly. In particular, given a state chosen uniformly at random from B, this measurement recovers nearlyñ bits of information about the identity of the state.
3. No n-party LOCC measurement strategy can distinguish these states very well. In particular, given a state chosen uniformly at random from B, no n-party LOCC measurement strategy using 2-outcome measurements can recover more than about n/2 bits of information about the identity of the state. Similar bounds hold for n-party LOCC measurement strategies using q-outcome measurements, for constant q.
We construct the set of states B as follows. Setñ = n−Θ(1). Briefly, B is a set of 2ñ states chosen independently and uniformly at random from the set {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− } ⊗n . To state this more explicitly, we define the following singlequbit states:
Choose a random mapping E : {0, 1}ñ → {00, 01, 10, 11} n , i.e., for each u ∈ {0, 1}ñ, assign E(u) a value chosen independently and uniformly at random in {00, 01, 10, 11} n . Also, for a = 1, 2, . . . , n, let E(u)a ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} denote the a'th entry in the string E(u). Then let B be the set of states |E(u) defined as follows:
We will consider the following state discrimination problem, which we describe as a game between a referee and a distinguisher. First, the referee chooses a random string u in {0, 1}ñ, and prepares the state |E(u) . Given this state, the distinguisher performs some measurement, and outputs a string z (over some alphabet). The goal of the distinguisher is to maximize the mutual information I(Z; U ), where U and Z are the random variables representing the referee's choice of the state and the distinguisher's output.
The pretty good measurement
In this section we show that the states |E(u) can be distinguished almost perfectly by a measurement that uses entanglement among the n qubits. In particular, we will consider the "pretty good measurement" [32] , which is defined as follows. Let ρ be the mixed state ρ := 2 −ñ u∈{0,1}ñ |E(u) E(u)|. Then the "pretty good measurement" is given by the following set of POVM elements:
(If ρ is not full-rank, then ρ −1/2 is defined on the support of ρ.)
We will show that, with high probability over the choice of the states |E(u) , the pretty good measurement works well. In particular, let Z be the output of the pretty good measurement; we will show that Z = U with probability close to 1, and the mutual information I(Z; U ) is close toñ.
Lemma 3.1. Let C ≥ 1. With probability ≥ 1 − 1 C (over the choice of E), we have
In particular, for any ε > 0, suppose thatñ satisfiesñ ≤ n − lg(C/ε 2 ) − 2. Then equation (10) implies that
Proof: First, we will give a lower-bound for Pr[Z = U ] in terms of the eigenvalues of the Gram matrix of the states |E(u) , using an argument due to Montanaro [33] . We write
We define the matrix P ∈ C 2ñ×2ñ , whose entries are Puv = E(u)|ρ −1/2 |E(v) . In addition, we define the Gram matrix G ∈ C 2ñ×2ñ , whose entries are Guv = E(u)|E(v) . It is easy to see that both P and G are positive semidefinite, and that P 2 = 2ñG; hence we can write P = 2ñ
We can lower-bound this as follows, using the convexity of the square function, and letting λu(G) denote the eigenvalues of G:
Next, define
and observe that λu(G) ≥ νu(G). So we have
Also note that
Finally, we will use Markov's inequality to show that, with high probability (over the choice of E), G − I F is not too large. We write:
(1 + 0 + 1 2
Hence, by Markov's inequality, for any C ≥ 1,
That is, with probability ≥ 1 − 1 C (over the choice of E),
Combining this with equation (17) completes the proof.
We have just shown a lower-bound on the success probability Pr[Z = U ]; this now implies a lower-bound on the mutual information I(Z; U ).
Proof: See Appendix B in the full version of this paper [42] .
1-pass LOCC strategies with 2-outcome measurements
In this section, we prove that the states |E(u) (u ∈ {0, 1}ñ) cannot be fully distinguished by any 1-pass LOCC strategy that uses 2-outcome measurements. In particular, we show that any such strategy cannot extract more than about n/2 bits of information about U . This claim holds with high probability over the randomized construction of the states |E(u) ; more precisely, the claim holds with high probability over the choice of the map E : {0, 1}ñ → {00, 01, 10, 11}
n , which we view as a random variable. The proof uses an entropy chaining argument, which is stated in Lemma A.1. This is essentially Dudley's inequality for bounding the supremum of an empirical process with Gaussian decaying correlations [23] , with some minor technical modifications (in particular, the result is stated as a tail bound for the supremum, rather than a bound on the expected supremum). Theorem 3.3. Let M be the set of all 1-pass LOCC strategies in the isolated qubits model using 2-outcome measurements. Let t0 > 0 and u ≥ 1. Then, with probability
(over the choice of E), the following statement holds:
where Z denotes the output of the strategy M.
Proof: First, let L be an ε-net for the set of single-qubit measurements with 2 outcomes where all POVM elements have rank 1, as described in Lemma 2.2; and set ε = 1/(100n). Let M be the set of all strategies that use measurements chosen from the set L. By Lemmas 2.1 and 2.4, any strategy in M can be approximated by one in M .
For any strategy M, let Z denote its output. Note that Z takes values in {0, 1} n , and we can split its output into two pieces, Z = (Z1,...,ñ, Zñ+1,...,n). So we can write
We want to show that H(Z1,...,ñ|U ) is not too small. Let M be the set of all strategies withñ steps, whose behavior matches the firstñ steps of some strategy in M . For any M ∈ M , we now define
which is a random variable depending on E. Let µM := EE QM; we will prove a lower bound for µM below. We will then use entropy chaining (Lemma A.1) to lower-bound the quantity
First, we evaluate µM:
where for convenience we wrote Pr(z|u) in place of Pr[Z1,...,ñ = z|U = u]. Consider any fixed u, z ∈ {0, 1}ñ. Recall that |E(u) is chosen uniformly at random in A ⊗n , where A := {|α00 , |α01 , |α10 , |α11 }. So we have
Furthermore, we know that ψ|M (z)|ψ = ñ a=1 ψ Qa(z<a) Ma(z ≤a ) ψ Qa(z<a) , where we used the notation introduced in Section 2. Hence we can write
Recall that we are considering single-qubit measurements with 2 outcomes, where each outcome corresponds to a rank-1 POVM element. Hence each M b (z ≤b ) is a rank-1 projector, i.e., it can be viewed as a density matrix of a quantum state. Hence we can write
Also, suppose we let R0 be the result of measuring the state Ma(z ≤a ) in the orthonormal basis {|α00 , |α11 }, and we let R1 be the result of measuring the same state in the orthonormal basis {|α01 , |α10 }. Then we can write ψa∈A − ψa|Ma(z ≤a )|ψa lg ψa|Ma(z ≤a )|ψa
using an entropic uncertainty relation of Maassen and Uffink [35, 36] . Substituting into the previous equations, we get
µM ≥ñ/2.
We now show several technical facts which are needed in order to apply the entropy chaining argument (Lemma A.1). First, fix some particular strategy M0 ∈ M . We will show that QM 0 is tightly concentrated around its mean. Observe that QM 0 = 2 −ñ u∈{0,1}ñ H(Z1,...,ñ|U = u) is a sum of 2ñ independent random variables, since the strings E(u) for different u are chosen independently at random. Using Hoeffding's inequality, we get that
or equivalently
Next, we show that when two strategies M and M are "similar," the random variables QM and Q M are positively correlated. In particular, suppose that M and M behave identically for the first steps. Let Z1,...,ñ and Z 1,...,ñ be the output of these two strategies; then (Z 1,..., , U ) and (Z 1,..., , U ) have the same distribution. So we can write
which again is a sum of 2ñ independent random variables. By Hoeffding's inequality,
We can rewrite this bound in terms of a metric d that measures the "distance" between strategies. We define d as follows: 
We then have
(39) Next, we bound the covering numbers of M with respect to the metric d. We use a simple bound:
(This bound simply counts the number of possible strategies with ñ − ε steps. Each such strategy is described by a binary tree of depth ñ − ε , and at every node there is a choice of which of the n qubits to measure next, and which of the measurements in the set L to perform.) We now bound the integral appearing in Lemma A.1 ("Dudley's entropy integral"): (here C0 is a numerical constant)
Recall that |L| ≤ O(1/ε 2 ) = O(n 2 ). Hence we have:
Finally, using Lemma A.1, we have that: for all t0 > 0 and u ≥ 1, with probability ≥ 1 − exp(−2t
, the following holds:
This implies that
Plugging into equation (23), we get that
Finally, using Lemmas 2.1 and 2.4, we get that ∀M ∈ M, I(Z; U ) < n−ñ 2 + n 25 +O(1)+ t0ñ 2ñ /2 +u·O( log n). 
1-pass LOCC strategies with q-outcome measurements
In this section, we consider a more general class of 1-pass LOCC strategies, that use q-outcome measurements (for any constant q). Again we show that the states |E(u) (u ∈ {0, 1}ñ) cannot be perfectly distinguished by such an adversary. Quantitatively, we show that such an adversary can extract at most ≈ (0.71)ñ bits of information about U ; we do not believe this bound is optimal, but it does nonetheless show that a constant fraction of the information in U is hidden from the adversary.
We use a different proof technique from the previous section: here we show an explicit lower bound on the Renyi collision entropy of U conditioned on the output Z ≤m of the first m steps of the adversary. This "collision entropy" proof is a useful alternative to the "entropy chaining" proof of the previous section. The collision entropy proof works quite well when q is large, whereas the entropy chaining proof has some difficulty because the number of possible measurement strategies grows rapidly with q. However, the collision entropy proof does not give a tight bound for any value of q, while the entropy chaining approach does give a tight bound when q = 2.
Theorem 3.4. Let M be the set of all 1-pass LOCC strategies in the isolated qubits model, using q-outcome measurements. Then, with probability ≥ 1 − e −Ω(n) (over the choice of E), the following statement holds:
Proof: First, let L be an ε-net for the set of single-qubit measurements with q outcomes where all POVM elements have rank 1, as described in Lemma 2.3; and set ε = 1/(200qn). Let M be the set of all strategies that use measurements chosen from the set L. By Lemmas 2.1 and 2.4, any strategy in M can be approximated by one in M .
We will analyze the first m steps of any strategy in M , where m = ñ/ lg(8/3) ≈ (0.7067)ñ. We will show the following bound: Lemma 3.5. With probability ≥ 1−e −Ω(n) (over the choice of E),
where Z1,...,m denotes the output of the first m steps of the strategy M, H2 denotes the Renyi collision entropy, and lg(
) ≈ 0.5850.
Proof (of Lemma 3.5): Note that the lemma is equivalent to the following statement: with high probability (over the choice of E), for all subsets of qubits A ⊂ [n], of size |A| = m, for all possible measurement outcomes MA that correspond to measuring the qubits in the set A using any measurements in the set L, H2(U |MA) (where we condition on observing the measurement outcome MA) is large.
Note that a measurement outcome MA is uniquely represented by a rank-1 POVM element of the form MA = i∈A Mi, where each Mi is a POVM element acting on qubit i, that corresponds to one possible outcome of some measurement in the set L.
We will now proceed as follows. First, we will show that, for every A and MA, Pr[MA] is approximately tr(MA)/2 m . Secondly, we will show that, for every A and MA, u Pr[MA|U = u] 2 is small. (To show these claims, we will use largedeviation bounds for every fixed choice of A and MA, followed by the union bound over all A and MA.) Finally, we will combine these two claims to get a lower-bound on H2(U |MA).
First, fix some subset of qubits A ⊂ [n], of size |A| = m. Let ρ be the mixed state presented to the adversary, ρ := 2 −ñ u∈{0,1}ñ |E(u) E(u)|, and let ρA be the reduced state on the subset A,
Note that EE ρA = I/2 m . We claim that, with high probability (over the choice of E), ρA is close to the maximally mixed state I/2 m , and hence any measurement outcome MA on the subset A will be observed with probability approximately tr(MA)/2 m . To show this, we will use the matrix Bernstein inequality [37] .
For convenience, define H := u∈{0,1}ñ Hu, where Hu :
−m I and EE Hu = 2 −m I. Note that the Hu are bounded:
The variance of H is described by
In particular, note that
Then the matrix Bernstein inequality [37] implies that, for any t > 0,
Now set
Recall that 0 ≤ m ≤ñ−lgñ. This implies that lgñ ≤ñ−m, hence t < t0 √ñ 2 (ñ−m)/2 ≤ t02ñ −m , and hence 2ñ −m +
t0m).
(55) Recall that ρA = 2 −ñ H, hence this implies a large-deviation bound for ρA: t0m) (over the choice of E), we have that for all subsets A of size m,
By setting t0 to be a sufficiently large constant, we can make the failure probability exponentially small in n. Finally, equation (57) implies that, for any subset A of size m, and any measurement outcome MA, the probability of observing MA (which is given by Pr[MA] = tr(MAρA)) satisfies the bound
(58) Next, fix some subset of qubits A ⊂ [n], |A| = m, and some measurement outcome MA. We will use Bernstein's inequality to upper-bound the quantity
Fu, where Fu := (tr(MA))
(59) Recall that MA is a tensor product of rank-1 operators acting on single qubits, and so MA/ tr(MA) can be written in the form
So we can write
First, we will calculate
We can upper-bound this as follows:
where we define the matrix T ∈ C 4×4 to be
(63) Now write the spectral decomposition of T :
where
(|00 ± |11 ) are the Bell states. Now write |ψa in the form |ψa = α|0 + β|1 . This implies
(65) Now we calculate
, and hence EE Fu ≤ (
In addition, we bound the variance of Fu as follows (using the fact that 0
. Now Bernstein's inequality [38] implies that, for all t > 0,
Recall that m ≤ñ/ lg(
), and note that this implies 2ñ(
This implies 2·2ñ(
) m . Substituting into the above equation, we get
Now take the union bound over all subsets A ⊂ [n] of size |A| = m, and all measurement outcomes MA that correspond to measurements chosen from the set L and performed on the qubits in the set A. (There are n m < 2 n such sets, and (q|L|)
O(qn lg(qn)) such measurement outcomes.) Then, with prob-
t1), we have that for all subsets A of size m, and all measurement outcomes MA,
By setting t1 := Θ(qn lg(qn)), we can make the failure probability exponentially small in n.
Finally, we will combine equations (58) and (70) to get a lower bound on H2(U |MA). For any A and MA, we write
This implies
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.5.
We now return to the proof of Theorem 3.4. Consider any strategy M ∈ M . We want to bound the mutual information
m). (73)
We bound the first term using Lemma 3.5. 
We bound the second term using Holevo's inequality [34] . 
Combining these bounds, we get
ONE-TIME MEMORIES FROM ISOLATED QUBITS
A one-time memory (OTM) is a device that implements the following functionality [1] : one party (Alice) can write two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1} k into the device, and then give the device to another party (Bob); after receiving the device, Bob can then choose to read either s or t, but not both. The main application of OTM's is to construct one-time programs [1, 2, 3] .
In this section, we will construct devices which are similar to OTM's, in the isolated qubits model. Our devices will not implement the ideal OTM functionality described above, but we conjecture that they do provide a weaker "leaky OTM" functionality that is still sufficient to construct one-time programs. We will first define this "leaky OTM" functionality, and then describe our construction based on isolated qubits.
Leaky OTM's
Definition 4.1. Fix some class of adversary strategies M, some leakage parameter δ ∈ [0, 1], and some failure probability ε ∈ [0, 1]. A leaky one-time memory (leaky OTM) with parameters (M, δ, ε) is a device that has the following behavior. Suppose that the device is programmed with two messages s and t chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1} k ; and let S and T be the random variables containing these messages. Then:
1. Correctness: There exists an honest strategy M (1) ∈ M that interacts with the device and recovers the message s with probability ≥ 1 − ε. Likewise, there exists an honest strategy M (2) ∈ M that recovers the message t with probability ≥ 1 − ε. This leaky OTM is weaker than the ideal OTM in two important respects: it assumes that the messages s and t are chosen uniformly at random, independent of all other variables; and it allows the adversary to obtain partial information about both s and t, so long as the adversary still has (1 − δ)k bits of uncertainty (as measured by the smoothed min-entropy).
Also, note that when we choose M to be the class of LOCC adversaries, the above definition yields information-theoretic (rather than computational) notions of correctness and security. In particular, the honest strategies are not required to be computationally efficient, but at the same time, security holds against LOCC adversaries with unbounded computational power.
We remark that this definition is mostly classical, rather than quantum. In particular, this definition assumes that the party who programs the OTM is classical, so that the messages s and t are classical bit strings. This definition also assumes that the party who reads the OTM may make (quantum) LOCC measurements, but immediately outputs a classical string z. These assumptions are reasonable, since the isolated qubits model is mostly classical, as LOCC operations can never generate quantum entanglement.
We conjecture that one can build a (non-leaky) OTM by combining a leaky OTM with an encryption scheme. The (non-leaky) OTM is prepared as follows: given two messages s and t, choose two keys k1 and k2 uniformly at random; then prepare a leaky OTM containing k1 and k2, as well as ciphertexts x = Enc k 1 (s) and y = Enc k 2 (t). To recover the message s, one can extract the key k1 from the leaky OTM, and then decrypt the ciphertext x; likewise, to recover the message t, one can extract the key k2, and decrypt the ciphertext y.
For this (non-leaky) OTM to be secure, the encryption scheme must be able to tolerate partial leakage of the keys k1 and k2. This bears some resemblance to previous work on leakage-resilient encryption [30, 31] , but with a different notion of leakage -in this case, the adversary's leakage function is constrained to use only LOCC operations, but may depend on side information (namely, the ciphertexts x and y). We think it should be possible to construct encryption schemes secure against this kind of leakage; intuitively, this is because the leakage function cannot make use of the ciphertexts x and y, because the decryption functions Dec k 1 (x) and Dec k 2 (y) are too complicated to evaluate using LOCC operations. However, we leave this as an open problem.
Finally, we conjecture that one can use similar ideas to construct garbled circuits, and thus one-time programs [1] .
Construction using isolated qubits
We consider a system of n isolated qubits, and we construct a set of states |E(s, t) (for s, t ∈ {0, 1} k ), where k ≈ (0.3991)n. First, choose a random function C : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n , i.e., for each s ∈ {0, 1} k , choose C(s) ∈ {0, 1} n independently and uniformly at random. Similarly, choose a random function D : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n . Now define
where the single-qubit states |α00 , |α01 , |α10 , |α11 are defined in the same way as in the previous section (see equation (7)). Note that these states can be prepared using singlequbit operations in the isolated qubits model.
We now describe the "honest" measurement strategies, that can be used to learn either s or t. The states |E(s, t) are reminiscent of Wiesner's conjugate coding [16] , in that measuring in one basis reveals information about s, while measuring in another basis reveals information about t. Let us define the states
Then measuring each qubit in the basis { β π/8 , β 5π/8 } returns a "noisy" copy of the string C(s), which can be decoded to recover s (since, with high probability, C is a good error-correcting code). Likewise, measuring each qubit in the basis { β −π/8 , β 3π/8 } returns a "noisy" copy of the string D(t), which can be decoded to recover t.
Is there some measurement strategy that will reveal both s and t? Wiesner pointed out that there does exist a joint measurement on the n qubits that can recover both s and t; this also follows from the "gentle measurement lemma" of Winter [39] . However, when the codes C and D are "unstructured," one may expect this measurement to be highly entangled, hence impossible to perform using only LOCC operations. We will give rigorous evidence that this is indeed the case.
We will show that these states partially satisfy the definition of a leaky OTM. In particular, with high probability over the random choice of C and D, the following statements hold:
1. Suppose s and t are chosen uniformly at random. There exists a sequence of single-qubit projective measurements that can reconstruct s with probability ≥ 1 − e −Ω(n) . Likewise, there exists a sequence of singlequbit projective measurements that can reconstruct t with probability ≥ 1 − e −Ω(n) .
2. Suppose s and t are chosen uniformly at random. No 1-pass LOCC measurement strategy using 2-outcome measurements can recover more than ≈ (1.9190)k bits of information about s and t. That is, if S and T are the random variables containing the strings s and t, and Z is the output of the measurement strategy, then
Note that we can write I(Z; S, T ) = H(S, T )−H(S, T |Z), hence this implies
These statements are similar to the definition of a leaky OTM, where M is the set of 1-pass LOCC measurement strategies using 2-outcome measurements, the leakage parameter is δ ≈ 0.9190, the failure probability is ε = e −Ω(n) , and the security condition is relaxed by replacing the smoothed min-entropy H ε ∞ with the Shannon entropy H. (Also, we set aside the requirement that the honest strategies must be computationally efficient.)
We believe it should be possible to prove much stronger results of this type. In particular, it should be possible to improve our bound on the leakage parameter δ, as our current proof technique is somewhat ad hoc. Also, we remark that some parts of our proof already imply bounds on the smoothed min-entropy H 
Correctness for honest parties
First, we show that the honest strategies for recovering either s or t (as described above) do succeed with high probability. Without loss of generality, suppose we want to recover s. Let S and T be random variables, distributed independently and uniformly on {0, 1} k . We are given the state |E(S, T ) , and we measure each qubit in the basis { β π/8 , β 5π/8 }. Let Z be the random variable containing the string of measurement outcomes, i.e., Z takes values in {0, 1}
n .
We decode Z as follows: we output any string t ∈ {0, 1} k such that dH (C(t), Z) ≤ r, where dH denotes the Hamming distance, and r is a parameter that we will set below. If there are multiple candidate strings t, we pick one of them in some arbitrary fashion. LetŜ be the random variable containing the output of this procedure.
Observe that Z is the output of a binary symmetric channel BSC(pe) applied to the string C(S), where the error probability pe is given by pe := sin 2 (π/8) ≈ 0.1464.
Recall that the channel BSC(pe) has capacity 1 − h(pe) ≈ 0.3991, where h(p) is the binary entropy function,
We will upper-bound the amount of information extracted during the first m steps, using Lemma 4.4: + lg(O(n lg n)).
Next, we will analyze the subsequent steps of the adversary. First, let us fix some subset of qubits A ⊂ [n], of size |A| = m, and some measurement outcome MA; these represent past actions of the adversary during its first m steps. We will then upper-bound the amount of information gained by the adversary in the nextm steps, conditioned on MA. Finally, we will use the union bound to show that this result holds simultaneously for all choices of A and MA.
To simplify the notation, let us define h := H2(S, T |MA), and pst := Pr[S = s, T = t|MA]; so we have
Note that h and pst depend only on the qubits in the set A; so they only depend on those random variables C(s)a and D(t)a with a ∈ A. As shown above, with probability ≥ 1 − e −Ω(n) (over this subset of the random variables C and D), h ≥ 2k − m lg( ) − lg(O(n lg n)).
We will look at the nextm steps of the adversary, and we setm := h − k ≥ k − m lg( ) − lg(O(n lg n)).
More precisely, we let M be the set of all possible measurement strategies that an adversary in M may follow for the nextm steps, after having received measurement outcome MA on the first m steps. We letZ := (Zm+1, . . . , Zm+m) be the output of the adversary on the nextm steps. Note that this depends only on the qubits outside the set A; so it only depends on those random variables C(s)a and D(t)a with a / ∈ A. We refer to this subset of random variables as C andD. We show the following lemma:
Lemma 4.5. Fix a particular subset of qubits A and a particular measurement outcome MA, as described above. Let t0 > 0 and u ≥ 1. With probability ≥ 1−exp(−2t The proof of Lemma 4.5 is similar to that of Theorem 3.3, with appropriate modifications to the large deviation bounds to allow for locally dependent random variables. See Section 4.4 in the full version of this paper [42] for details.
We now return to the proof of Theorem 4.3. We take the union bound over all subsets A ⊂ [n] of size |A| = m, and all measurement outcomes MA that correspond to measurements chosen from the set L and performed on the qubits in the set A. Then, with probability ≥ 1 − 2 O(n lg n) · exp(−2t
, we have that:
for all subsets A of size m, and for all measurement outcomes MA, I(Z; S, T |MA) <m 2 + t0m 2m /2 + u · O( log n).
By setting t0 := Θ( √ n log n) and u := Θ( √ n log n), we can make the failure probability exponentially small in n.
Hence, for any measurement strategy M ∈ M , with output Z, and any sequence of measurement outcomes z1,...,m, we have I(Zm+1,...,m+m; S, T |Z1,...,m = z1,...,m) <m 2 + O( √ n log n), Finally, we consider the remaining steps of the adversary. Using Holevo's inequality [34] (see the proof of Theorem 3.4), we get that I(Zm+m+1,...,n; S, T |Z1,...,m+m) ≤ n − m −m.
Combining equations (92), (99) and (100), we get that I(Z; S, T ) ≤ m lg( + O( √ n log n).
From equations (85), (90) and (95), we have that 
Combining these bounds, we get that
as desired.
